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100   Appalachia
Accidents
Analysis from the White Mountains of  
New Hampshire and occasionally elsewhere
In Deep
When many of us set off from a trailhead, we hope at some point to “get in 
deep,” to arrive at a place and a state of mind seldom visited, one where the 
day’s only news is scripted by weather and the crawl of seasons. The madding 
tumult of polity and politics recedes then for a while, and we can attend to 
our old selves and the mostly hidden lives of animals and trees, to the so slow 
pulse of stones. That we can walk to and still find such places is both salve and 
miracle. That “getting in deep” also offers a common metaphor for trouble 
The Pemigewasset Wilderness in winter is beautiful, remote, and sometimes  
dangerous. JERRY AND MARCY MONKMAN/ECOPHOTOGRAPHY
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seems both a necessary and hard companion to our escapes. Sometimes, once 
found, “deep” can be a hard place to leave.
This column searches stories and rescues for the moment when a hike or 
a climb morphs from a day away to one of trouble. Often we clearly recall 
that moment—a slipped step, a blank wall of woods where the trail should 
be, lightning’s flashing announcement of a weather front—but even in these 
instances, reconstruction of the path to that moment can be chocked with 
small decisions, some made with foresight, some made without it. Knowing 
the content and character of those decisions can help us develop an awareness 
that offers a little added safety in our adventures.
Heartland
For a number of us, the beating wild heart of the White Mountains lies in the 
Pemigewasset Wilderness. There, we can be as remote (in crow-flight miles) 
from roads as anywhere else in those mountains; on Bondcliff, a slow sweep 
of the surrounding horizon reveals only more mountains. Like all of its breth-
ren Whites, Bondcliff and its siblings, Bond and West Bond, are oft-visited, 
so their solitude often contains other seekers, but there the feeling of being 
“away, in deep,” persists.
Pursuit of that feeling drew 26-year-old Jack H. to the Pemigewasset on 
December 24, 2016, a day when he was likely to be alone. The forecast for the 
day reinforced that possibility because it called for snow shifting to rain near 
the storm’s end; then, usual winter cold was predicted to blow back in. Jack set 
out from Lincoln Woods some time after 8 a.m., having left a trip plan with 
his father, Edward, indicating that he planned to climb the Bondcliff Trail 
to West Bond and then return later that day. He texted his parents around 
4 p.m. from the area of the Bonds, saying that he was running late but expected 
to be home around 10 or 11 p.m. Concerned when Jack had not returned by 
late night on the 24th, Edward contacted Lincoln, New Hampshire, police, 
who checked the Lincoln Woods parking area at 2 a.m. and saw Jack’s car. 
Edward called again in the morning, and at 8 a.m., Lincoln police confirmed 
that Jack’s car was still in the lot. That news prompted Edward to call New 
Hampshire Fish and Game; District 3 Lt. Jim Kneeland then called Edward 
back, gathered information, and set about responding. 
Edward said Jack was experienced, having climbed many of the high peaks 
in the Northeast, and well equipped but not carrying overnight gear. Still, the 
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22-mile length of Jack’s projected hike and stormy weather on the 24th sug-
gested a possible delay in his getting back out. Kneeland resolved to send a 
conservation officer in along the Lincoln Woods and Bondcliff Trails to look 
for a sign of Jack. A little before 10 a.m. Conservation Officer Kevin Bronson 
set off on his snow machine. Bronson called at 10:30 a.m. from the Bondcliff 
Trail where it turns northeast from the former Wilderness Trail junction, say-
ing that he’d found no sign of Jack. After Bronson waited there a half-hour, 
Kneeland then pulled him back out and summoned two more COs, Eric Flu-
ette and Brad Morse. By 1:30 p.m. Bronson, Fluette, and Morse were headed 
back in the nearly five miles toward the old trail junction on snow machines, 
and a little after 2 p.m. they donned snowshoes and heavy packs and began to 
climb the 4.6 miles to Bondcliff.
Thick snow slowed the COs. They took turns breaking trail, checked 
possible campsites, and managed their clothing layers to minimize sweating. 
The COs were hoping, of course, to find tracks that might lead them to Jack. 
But on Christmas, when many are tucked into tables and dinner at home, the 
COs found only fresh, heavy snow. Then, at around 8 p.m., the COs came 
upon tracks and, soon after, Jack’s body near the large cairn on the exposed 
summit of Bondcliff. They called Kneeland, and, after making a plan for the 
night with the COs, Kneeland set about turning the next day’s planned search 
into a recovery.
By the time the three COs found Jack, the temperature had followed the 
forecast to near 0 and the winds had ramped up. Kneeland asked the COs if 
they felt OK spending the rest of the night on Bondcliff, and they answered 
yes. When Kneeland checked back in with them a while later, they assured 
him they were OK.
By 5:30 a.m. they were up and about atop Bondcliff, where they awaited 
the sunrise so they could examine and photograph the scene of Jack’s death. 
The day broke windless and clear. Jack’s backpack was 10 feet away from him 
in between two rocks, and his crampons were just above the pack. Jack was 
wearing Merrill three-season hiking boots. Everything was open, and his gear 
was scattered. His phone and cables lay on the rocks under his pack, and 
batteries were out of the headlamp and on the ground. Jack had one arm in 
his Gore-Tex jacket but the jacket was twisted and unzipped. His puffy coat 
underneath was on upside down and unzipped.
At 7:50 a.m. the flight crew aboard a New Hampshire National Guard 
Blackhawk helicopter made contact with the COs, and, after ascertaining 
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that they couldn’t land in the area, hoisted the three COs and Jack’s body 
aboard and flew to the parking area at Lincoln Woods.
Comment: This is a straightforward hypothermia death, although how 
Jack got there forms a puzzle. When found, he was wearing winter clothing, 
but the outer layers of that gear were on in a “confusing” manner. Such a find-
ing is consistent with the tendency of hypothermia victims to grow confused 
about their condition and reality. Searchers frequently report finding victims 
partially undressed in response to the delusion that they are too warm, or 
because simple tasks such as donning a jacket become suddenly complex to 
the hypothermic mind.
Here, we turn to this question: How does a reasonably experienced hiker 
end up losing his way and life in such a fashion? Jack had spent a good measure 
of time in the woods and mountains during his 26 years and, according to his 
obituary, he also had the experience of a 72-day National Outdoor Leadership 
School training course in the Yukon while in college. 
We look first, as is often true, to the weather, both its essentials and what 
it implies. The forecast—snow on the 24th, going possibly to rain at storm’s 
end, followed by cold—joined with the holiday to suggest that few if any 
others would be out in this remote area, setting up the near certainty that the 
trail would, at some point, not be broken. And yet when found, Jack had no 
shelter, sleeping bag, or snowshoes with him. Because his experience would 
suggest carrying all three on this winter hike, we have to assume that he left 
them behind intentionally. Here we arrive in the decision-making terrain we 
all walk before we hike or climb.
Experience teaches us we should pack for worst-case scenarios, even when 
our plan is to go out and back in a day. But worst cases weigh more than opti-
mism’s minimal gear. And when our experience always has included coming 
back, we may begin to leave out some of the weight of safety; carrying that 
weight time and again and never using it can tempt us to say, “Oh, I’ll leave 
this stuff today. It will make me faster; I’ll sweat less; it will be easier.” 
The forecast for December 24 also carried a deceptively subtle warning: 
Snow with possibility of rain indicates warm-for-winter temperatures. We 
know enough to feel the elemental fear of deep cold and high winds; we 
shy from them. But this forecast also contains a killer—temperatures around 
freezing mean wet snow, and, as a hiker works at going up, especially if he 
must break trail, liberal sweat. Both of these are stage-setters for hypothermia. 
Once, while reading some of Laura and Guy Waterman’s work (few hikers in 
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the last 100 years have threaded as many trails in as many different weathers 
as the Watermans), I came across a picture of them hiking along on a snowy 
day. What made the photo odd was that, there in the snowy mountain woods, 
both Laura and Guy were carrying umbrellas like London strollers. Take a 
moment to count the number of times you have passed winter hikers using 
umbrellas. OK, we continue. Their article explained the umbrellas: Wet snow 
falling and melting on you is a surefire way to get soaked, they said. And get-
ting wet with snow everywhere and temperatures in the 30s makes getting 
dry and staying warm very difficult. Better to keep the snow off, they wrote. 
Here, we think, lies the likely key to Jack’s tragedy: The weather and work 
of hiking through thick snow soaked him; once wet, he couldn’t get dry, and 
the cold began to do its work. That scenario would have been perilous even 
had he carried shelter and a sleeping bag, but they would have afforded him a 
chance to strip off the wet clothes, keep any new snow or rain off, and rewarm 
himself. The scatter of Jack’s belongings that the COs found mimics the way 
the hypothermic mind scatters—clothing and reason get turned inside out; 
it all grows “confusing.”
Also, holding off hypothermia takes more than staying dry, or having 
shelter in which to dry off. When the COs found Jack, they noted that he 
had three water bottles, each under a liter in capacity. One of the bottles was 
empty; one was half- and one completely full. If, as is likely, those bottles 
represent the total of what Jack drank, he was likely to be dehydrated, which 
jumps a hiker’s susceptibility to hypothermia. As comparison, CO Morse 
said that to stay hydrated, he drank two full liters of water while climbing the 
4.6 miles to Bondcliff. COs also found no food with Jack. Even if he’d eaten 
liberally during the day, he’d have needed more food to fuel his walk out or to 
survive the night he was trapped in.
Finally, a 22-mile round-trip day hike on trails that are likely to have 
unbroken sections of new snow is a very ambitious plan. Jack’s 4 p.m. text 
indicated that he had gotten to his goal. It also indicates that the cold may 
already have been at work. If Jack texted from near the summit of Bondcliff, 
he was more than 8 miles and, in the day’s conditions, a good five-plus hours 
from his car. Add in a drive of three or so hours, and you find that the fig-
ures projecting his being home between 10 and 11 p.m. are off, just the sort 
of impaired calculation common to hypothermia. The way out must have 
quickly gotten as murky as the twilight from which he sent his message.
—Sandy Stott and Ty Gagne
(See Gagne’s article, “Weakness in Numbers,” on page 56.)
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You Don’t Have to Go Far
When you’re on the novice end of the experience spectrum, you don’t have to 
go far to get in deep. A 6:28 p.m. call for help on January 5, 2017, illustrated 
that. The caller, Xusheng “Alex” W., age 17, of Toronto, Canada, was having 
trouble making his stove work and couldn’t fully set up his tent at the Liberty 
Spring Tentsite on the Franconia Ridge. He was cold and dehydrated. Alex 
was also alone.
The rescue that ensued, coordinated by NHFG Lt. Jim Kneeland and 
accomplished by Sgt. Mark Ober and CO Bob Mancini, was a garden-variety 
sort: Ober and Mancini used snow machines to get to the Liberty Spring 
trailhead, climbed to the tentsite, warmed Alex with hot drinks and helped 
him hike out, arriving at the Flume parking lot a little before 1 a.m. The res-
cue’s backstory, however, asks telling.
After flying from Toronto to New York City, Alex took a bus to Hanover, 
New Hampshire, and, from there, a taxi to the trailhead for the Flume off 
Route 93 on January 5. He climbed away from the parking lot bearing a 
pack heavy with new equipment and an altered plan to spend the next four 
days covering 44 trail-miles in the Pemigewasset Wilderness. Alex’s original 
plan had been altered a day earlier when he and his mother had spoken with 
CO Jonathan DeLisle at NHFG headquarters in Concord, New Hampshire. 
Hobbled some by the difficulty the family had understanding English, DeLisle 
had advised strongly against Alex’s initial plan to hike from Woodstock to 
Gorham alone, adding that recent weather had made the trails very icy and 
travel hard, even for an experienced hiker. Kneeland later learned that the 
family had also called the Appalachian Mountain Club and received the same 
don’t-go-there warnings.
But there, on the night of the 5th, Alex was, and there at the trailhead 
Kneeland sat, in his truck that often serves as an incident command post 
during a rescue, on the phone with Alex’s mother, summoning her to fly to 
Manchester, New Hampshire, the next day to retrieve her son. Kneeland had 
just gotten off the phone with Alex after advising him to get in his sleeping 
bag and await the two officers climbing up. In his official report, Kneeland 
described what Ober and Mancini found:
At 2214 hours, CO Mancini and Sgt. Ober reached the Liberty Spring Tentsite 
and located Alex W., who was in his sleeping bag inside his tent, which was 
not staked up because he did not know how to set the tent up. The COs gave 
him warm fluids and got him dressed for the hike back out. CO Mancini 
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determined that Alex’s pack was very heavy, so he gave the tent to Ober to 
carry and then lightened the load further by leaving most of Alex’s food at the 
site, including two bags of mangos, four jars of Nutella, and a large salami.
Comment: At the heart of this incident lies a common parent–child ten-
sion—the child seeks to set out on his own, to become himself or herself 
through some sort of test; the parent tries to get the best advice about the saf-
est route. But once that advice suggests no trip-test at all, trouble ensues. It’s 
easy to see—even from spare details—that Alex had no business setting off in 
winter with equipment he couldn’t use properly on a multiday solo hike. As 
Kneeland pointed out later, Alex was actually lucky he hit trouble early, where 
it took only a few hours for help to get to him. Had he been in by Bondcliff or 
elsewhere deep in the Pemi Wilderness, where phone contact is sketchy and 
it would have taken longer hours to find him, Alex might have encountered 
a different ending.
Step now beyond the obvious understanding that Alex didn’t have the 
requisite experience and shouldn’t have been allowed to go. What then? 
Anyone who’s ever shared space with a brooding 17-year-old wants an answer. 
Kneeland’s last line of his report suggests one: “I then provided her [Alex’s 
mother] with the phone number for the International Mountain Climbing 
School in Conway [New Hampshire] to see if they could hook Alex up with 
a guide.”
That advice, given in the aftermath of the rescue, when Alex next proposed 
to his mother that he do a series of day climbs before going home, is perfect. 
If, when we reach our breakaway age, we are lucky, we find a guide. That 
guide, while serving in a demi-parental role, carries none of the real parent’s 
emotional baggage with her or his child, and so there is a chance the younger 
will listen, learn, and make a test trip without meeting trouble. Some guides 
or teachers are paid, as are those of IMCS; some may be friends or relatives, 
luckily found.
Night Phones: A Call from the Ridge
A scan of incident data makes it clear, but I still like to point out on occasion 
that much of the rescue work in the Whites takes place off hours. The two 
incidents just reviewed involved night work, as will the next two. Someone’s 
having an off night in the mountains often means no night off for rescuers.
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The sun was near setting on February 15, 2017, when NHFG’s Lt. Jim 
Kneeland got a 4:15 p.m. call that a hiker was having trouble finding his way 
near the summit of Mount Lafayette. Not that anyone could see the sun, 
as it was snowing heavily, and Vincent H., age 25, of Quebec, Canada, had 
called his girlfriend at home to say that, after reaching the summit at 3 p.m., 
he had lost the trail while trying to descend. Kneeland began the calls that 
gather the information needed to mount a rescue: Vincent’s intended route, 
how equipped he was, whether he had companions (he was hiking with his 
two dogs), and any other relevant details. Calls to Vincent didn’t get through, 
but a text did draw a 4:57 p.m. response to Kneeland’s question: Do you need 
help? “Yess,” said the text.
Kneeland texted Vincent to call 911, and the dispatcher transferred the call 
to him, where, with a translator’s assistance, Kneeland figured out that Vin-
cent had slid down an icy ledge and felt trapped at its base. Kneeland was able 
to match Vincent’s phone’s coordinates with a texted map location he’d got-
ten earlier to fix Vincent’s location just south of Lafayette’s summit. Kneeland 
figured it would take about six hours to reach him. He summoned NHFG 
COs from the Advanced Search and Rescue Team (of which Kneeland is the 
leader) and members of Mountain Rescue Service.
Then the 911 supervisor called to say that Vincent and the translator had 
continued texting; Vincent had rediscovered the trail and was going to go 
“down.” That worried Kneeland, because if Vincent followed a trail in that 
area it would be the Franconia Ridge Trail north up Lafayette or south up 
Mount Lincoln. Both routes are mostly above treeline and would further 
expose Vincent. If, on the other hand, Vincent actually went “down,” he 
might end up in the Pemigewasset Wilderness or in Walker Ravine. Kneeland 
told the 911 people that he hoped Vincent would stay put because they had 
a known location for him, but the link between Vincent and 911 had gone 
silent.
Not knowing if Vincent was moving forced Kneeland to split his NHFG 
team and send one group up the Old Bridle Path (at 7 p.m.) and the other 
up the Falling Waters Trail (at 7:40 p.m.). Snow was still falling heavily, with 
temperatures in the 20s. (Nearby Mount Washington got a foot of snow on 
the 15th and an added 11 inches on the 16th.) MRS rescuers were to follow 
with a Sked litter, which can be snaked through tough terrain. An 8:50 p.m. 
text from Vincent provided clarity that he hadn’t moved, and MRS started up 
the Old Bridle Path a few minutes later.
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Vincent’s audible panic on a 10 p.m. call further amped up the night but 
provided little other information, as the mix of a language barrier and Vin-
cent’s screaming made his words unintelligible. The NHFG teams reported 
slow going because they had to use snowshoes and break trail all the way. 
The Old Bridle Path team passed Greenleaf Hut (a mile below the summit of 
Lafayette) at 10:50 p.m., and the MRS team, following the first team’s tracks, 
caught them just shy of the summit a little after midnight. At 12:45 a.m., 
MRS’s Brian Johnston called from the summit, saying that they could see a 
flashing light and hear a dog barking. A few minutes later, the team was with 
Vincent, where, using the shelter of a Bothy Bag, they began the work of 
rewarming him. By 1:30 a.m., having rewarmed Vincent and given him some 
dry clothes, the teams began their walk out, getting back to the trailhead a 
little before 5 a.m.
Comment: This incident, while rife with uncertain communications and 
extended by the slow work of also navigating a storm that dropped waist-deep 
snow, suggests short analysis. A solo hiker set off at 9 a.m. on a winter-mild 
morning but in the face of a forecasted storm. He took six hours to reach 
the summit of Lafayette, a far too lengthy allotment of time for a February 
hike—a turnaround time of noon to 1 p.m. would have been OK. He then got 
caught by the storm, and once caught, didn’t have the skill to get down. Nor 
did Vincent know enough about where he was to figure out how he might 
get into safer terrain.
Vincent’s hours trapped in the storm were a near thing. Had NHFG’s 
and MRS’s teams not reached him, the storm and hypothermia would have 
claimed him. When MRS rescuers got to Vincent, he was cold and asleep, not 
waking until they were right with him, despite the barking of his dogs. Vin-
cent had also lost his gloves in the gale, he said, leading him to contemplate 
killing and cutting open one of his dogs to rewarm himself. Even as fantasy, 
that’s a desperate sign. Vincent acknowledged to Kneeland his debt to his 
rescuers, saying he felt that they had saved his life.
A Night Near the Boulder
A few minutes after midnight on April 23, 2017, NHFG District 1 Lt. Wayne 
Saunders got a call from the state police dispatcher. Alexander S., age 27, from 
the Czech Republic, felt he was in trouble somewhere above Glen Boulder 
on its eponymous trail. Saunders was able to make erratic phone contact with 
Alexander via 911 and learned that strengthening winds had bent Alexander’s 
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tent poles, tearing the tent fabric and letting in the flying snow. Neither wind 
nor snow had been present when Alexander set up camp for his first evening 
of a planned multiday hike. But Saunders also ascertained that Alexander was 
warm and mostly protected in his sleeping bag and extra clothing, and so not 
in immediate peril. The two agreed that Alexander would hunker down for 
the night’s remainder, and COs would start up at daybreak to check on him.
At around 5:30 a.m., Alexander made another worried call. NHFG COs 
Matt Holmes and Glen Lucas began climbing just after dawn, and around 
9:30 a.m. they met Alexander just above Glen Boulder as he descended with 
support from a Samaritan hiker, Claude V., who had encountered Alexander 
earlier that morning. The COs escorted Alexander down.
Comment: The night scene of Alexander’s initial call marks this rescue, 
asking us to imagine what prompted a well-outfitted hiker to punch the three 
digits of emergency. When Alexander set out on his multiday hike, he was 
carrying all the essentials, and when he pulled over for the night somewhere 
above Glen Boulder, the wind was light. Both the spot above treeline and the 
weather seemed agreeable. Alexander awoke to a different night: winds up, 
tent poles bent, snow fingering into his shelter. Panic ensued.
And yet, the day’s weather summaries from the nearby Mount Washing-
ton Observatory don’t speak of what we often think of as extremes. Tempera-
tures hovered in the upper 20s, with the winds averaging 27 mph; the top 
gust blew through from the northwest at 51 mph; 2 inches of snow fell. The 
23rd reads similarly: temps in the 20s, winds averaging 39, top gust of 67, 
half an inch of snow. White Mountain veterans shrug at such reports, even as 
they also know trouble comes easily in such typical shoulder season weather. 
These veterans, however, are unlikely to be found in a tent, above treeline on 
Washington’s upper flanks, unless they’re training for some alpine escapade in 
the world’s big mountains. In that case, the veterans would be in winter tents 
built to withstand wind and snow. 
But for someone unfamiliar with the Whites and the way wind can work 
on a tent, the absolute darkness and the varied, pitched voices of wind could 
seem ready to blow life away. Those voices ask only questions: Will my tent 
last? Will it blow harder? Will the night wind, finally, blow me away? And 
so, the call. Saunders’s ability to get the essentials of the moment, even over 
sketchy phone connections, and build a plan to check on Alexander without 
exposing his COs to the risks of a night rescue is laudable. His experience in 
and knowledge of the Whites balanced out Alexander’s lack of both. Added 
voice: The second call at 5:30 a.m. underlined how long such a night can feel.
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A Short Note on Going Solo
All four incidents examined thus far involved solo hikers. Readers of this col-
umn have probably noted that I don’t condemn solo hiking as simply out of 
reason’s bounds. In fact, one can argue that an experienced, fit solo hiker can 
travel winter’s backcountry more safely than some groups. But choosing to 
go it alone puts a premium on all of a hiker’s readings—of weather, of self, of 
terrain. Should conditions, external or internal, change, you need to know in 
detail where and who you are. Although Jack seemed on his way and closest 
to such a level, none of the four solo hikers chronicled in these incidents had 
the familiarity and mountain-nous to be where he was.
Composed Rescue 
Editor’s note: The following incident, selected for its resonance with and contrast 
from a famous August 1959 tragedy on Cannon Cliff, is excerpted from Critical 
Hours: Search and Rescue in the White Mountains, Sandy Stott’s book due out 
in spring 2018 from University Press of New England. In 1959, two young men 
from Connecticut got trapped partway up Cannon Cliff, and the ensuing rescue 
attempt took two days to unfold. The young men died of hypothermia just as 
rescuers reached them. That rescue is told at length in Appalachia (“The Cannon 
Mountain Tragedy,” by George T. Hamilton et al., December 1959, 2 no. 4, pages 
441–461.)
Every day, as he sets out solo on his rounds, NHFG District 3’s Lt. Jim Knee-
land does so behind the wheel of a 2012 Chevrolet Tahoe that’s equipped as 
a mobile command post. Its truck bed can accommodate a snowmobile or 
all-terrain vehicle and Kneeland “usually carries enough equipment to equip 
a couple of rescuers, if they need more stuff.” The Tahoe is also supplied with 
mobile radios for contact with search-and-rescue units, as well as cell phones 
and laptops that are loaded with, among other things, a mapping program. 
“It is a very comfortable rig,” says Kneeland. Given that on a rescue-intensive 
weekend the Tahoe can become a second home for him, that’s a good thing.
On November 19, 2016, a 10:39 p.m. call for help from Cannon Mountain 
summoned Kneeland from a comfortable night at home back to his truck. 
It had been a moderate late-fall Saturday, with the temperature on nearby 
Mount Washington averaging 43 degrees Fahrenheit with light winds. A 
colder day was on the way, as was some rain, which up high sounded more 
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like ice. On Cannon’s iconic cliff, which rises above Franconia Notch, two 
Massachusetts climbers, William S., 29, and Michael F., 23, were stuck some 
few hundred feet below the top. Earlier in the day, the pair, who had climbed 
quite a bit throughout New England but never on Cannon Cliff, had aimed 
up a popular route named Moby Grape. But, after starting late and encoun-
tering route-finding difficulties that slowed them, they’d been benighted. Still 
they had persisted, until finally they felt unable to go up or down.
Kneeland used the climbers’ call to plot their location, and, after he advised 
them that they were around 390 feet below the helicopter-landing zone at the 
cliff’s top, the climbers said they’d try to find another route up to that point. 
Kneeland checked back in with them just before midnight and found them 
still stuck but game for another attempt. Finally, the climbers called back 
just after 1 a.m., saying they were right back where they’d been when they 
first called. Noting the wet, going-toward-winter forecast, Kneeland decided 
a night rescue was necessary, and that meant calling the high-angle experts 
from MRS and figuring out how to get them in place to effect a rescue. He 
made that call at 1:14 a.m. Readers of White Mountain accident history may 
recall the 1959 Cannon Cliff tragedy of Alfred Whipple Jr., 20, and Sidney 
Crouch, 21, both of Ledyard, Connecticut. The differences between the 1959 
and 2017 rescues of stranded climbers on Cannon point to how much has 
changed over these years, and to what someone in Kneeland’s position can 
command when called today. 
MRS, founded in 1972, makes the biggest difference, and in that group’s 
climbers—Steve Larson, Kurt Winkler, Paul Cormier, Joe Lentini, Charlie 
Townsend, and Geoff Wilson—Kneeland had six of the region’s finest. Their 
drive to Franconia was a short one. Still, it was a lightless night, and the climb-
ers in need of rescue were stranded far up the cliff; getting to them could be 
an iffy proposition. But here, too, Kneeland and MRS had a new resource: 
During recent years, as Cannon had continued to attract its share of res-
cues, SAR groups had plotted the GPS coordinates of places where an anchor 
could be set to lower rescuers from the cliff’s top. With the coordinates of the 
stranded climbers also available, Kneeland and the MRS climbers found that 
they could choose an anchor directly above the pair, and, if all went well, rap-
pel down to them and bring them back up. That, of course, would be far less 
work and far quicker than climbing to them—and far safer. MRS’s Cormier 
later reflected that the location of the route down to the climbers had been 
“the perfect marriage of 21st-century technology and old-style experience. We 
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had the GPS coordinates, and I had been to this route a number of times. I 
could say, ‘It’s just over here a little way,’ and the coordinates confirmed that.”
Such a plan prompted another concern: It would be great to drop from 
the top, but getting to that top would take time, too. Must rescuers hike up 
Cannon before dropping down from its crest for the rescue? Kneeland ran 
through his list of contacts and pressed a number, rousing one of the Cannon 
Tramway operators. Here were the fruits of a trade Kneeland had made last 
year, bartering some work investigating a skier’s death for the home numbers 
of tram operators. He now had a way to get rescuers and as much gear as they 
wanted to the mountaintop. That carrying capacity counted importantly too: 
the tram could accommodate both rescuers and however many ropes they 
needed; lugging as much up on foot would have taken time, and likely led to 
thinner support for the rescue. 
MRS’s six climbers arrived at around 4 a.m., and Kneeland then sent them 
and fellow CO Josiah Towne up to clifftop on the tram. He then drove the 
Tahoe to a particular spot on Route 93. “I’ve got a spot down here for each 
route on the cliff,” he said, reflecting the number of times he has been called 
there. Each roadside spot gives him clear sight and radio lines for a route up. 
Also, before Towne went up to help the MRS climbers, Kneeland told him 
that he was to do whatever the MRS climbers wanted, even if that “means 
sitting in a bush watching.” With this directive, Kneeland was setting up a 
clear chain of authority. He was also calling on experience. The dark clifftop 
of Cannon can be tricky to read; in a few steps, someone can go from nearly 
level ground to cliffside. Kneeland wanted no added trouble that night. 
Cormier recalled that Towne was a big help: “He worked like crazy as we 
hauled the climbers up.”
With the anchor set on a preselected spot above the climbers and lined up 
with Kneeland’s truck lights in the valley, Larson went down over the edge a 
little after 5:30 a.m., dropping right to the two men, while his MRS colleagues 
tended the anchors. When each stranded climber was ready to come up, the 
five MRS rescuers and CO hauled hard. One at a time, each was brought 
back up to safety by 8:30 a.m., and then they all took a much more prosaic 
walk back down to the base, where they arrived around 10 a.m.
With Sunday still stretched before him, Kneeland was back in his Tahoe.
Comment: The rains washed in, and the temperatures dropped. Novem-
ber 20 averaged only 23 degrees atop Mount Washington. But by then, every-
one was off the cliff. Though technical climbing incidents are not usually the 
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province of this column, I’ve included this one for its example of the resources 
upon which White Mountain search and rescue can draw now. This rescue 
offered a happy ending in clear contrast to a draining, two-day saga in August 
1959, when rescuers had to be summoned from afar and two Connecticut 
boys died of hypothermia high on Cannon Cliff.
The Beauty of the Mountain Civic Body
This report’s final three incidents are linked by the mountain altruism of those 
nearby or summoned to help. Even before official rescue could be mounted, 
the work of rescue had begun.
On November 13, 2016, a 10:30 a.m. call alerted NHFG Sgt. Mark Ober 
to an emergency a half-mile below Carter Notch Hut on the Nineteen-Mile 
Brook Trail. James N., age 59, had collapsed suddenly as his large party of Boy 
Scouts and their chaperones descended from the hut. Members of the party 
had already begun CPR, although Ober wouldn’t know that until he was able 
to establish communication with the group via Chris DeMasi, the Carter 
caretaker who had descended to the group and who had cell phone coverage. 
Meanwhile, the initial report led Ober to summon COs Matt Holmes, Glen 
Lucas, and Eric Fluette and Androscoggin Valley Search and Rescue volun-
teers Mike Pelchat and Diane Holmes. Ober also called the New Hampshire 
National Guard to see if he could get helicopter assistance, and they scram-
bled to gather a crew and fly to the scene.
The rescuers who rushed to the scene reported that James’s group had 
kept up CPR during the roughly two hours it took for them to get there, but, 
sadly, even as rescuers carried with them advanced medical equipment, noth-
ing could be done to save James. The National Guard’s Blackhawk helicopter 
was aloft by 12:40 p.m., and not long after 1 p.m., it arrived, coordinated with 
rescuers on the ground, and lifted James’s body out.
In the aftermath, AMC provided private space for James’s family to gather 
and learn the details of his death; NHFG also summoned its chaplain to pro-
vide support for the family and the Scout troop.
An 11:50 a.m. call from Cannon Cliff on February 4, 2017, informed 
NHFG Lt. Jim Kneeland that climber Nick P., age 47, had fallen some 50 
feet while on the third pitch of the Black Dike route. Kneeland contacted 
the caller, David S., a climber who was lower on the same route and in 
voice contact with the injured man. As David assessed the situation, he said 
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he and others on the scene could lower Nick to the cliff’s base but would 
need carryout assistance from rescuers once they reached the talus slope below 
the cliff.
Kneeland set about gathering that assistance, calling on the Pemigewasset 
Valley Search and Rescue Team and NHFG COs, and those rescuers began to 
reach the base of the cliff a little after 2 p.m., just as David S. and an estimated 
thirteen other climbers completed lowering Nick from the cliff. From there, 
Nick was carried and then hauled finally via snow machine to the roadside 
and taken to Littleton Regional Hospital.
On the same day at around 3 p.m., Nicholas K., 32, fell while backcoun-
try skiing on Mount Moosilauke’s Carriage Road. His companion, Corinna 
O., called 911. NHFG CO Greg Jellison called the number provided by the 
911 dispatcher and got a man named Stefan, who was part of a large party 
that had come upon Nicholas and Corinna. Stefan’s group had repurposed 
a plastic sled they had with them and was now hauling Nicholas out. Ste-
fan estimated they would reach the trailhead at Breezy Point Road around 
5:45 p.m., which they did. Jellison and members of the Warren and Went-
worth fire departments met the rescue party there.
On February 4, 2017, rescuers lower Nick P., who had fallen 50 feet while climbing the 
Black Dike route on Cannon Mountain. NEW HAMPSHIRE FISH AND GAME
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Comment: Even as many of us leave a trailhead in the Whites to get away 
from the jostling of everyday life, in our popular and peopled mountains, 
other seekers are often nearby. That those seekers almost invariably gather to 
help when trouble occurs, often showing resilience and inventiveness in sup-
port of whoever has fallen, offers a redemptive look at us, the mountain drawn. 
Each of us hopes for a lift from getting in deep in the hills; sometimes that 
lift comes from the spirit of sister- and brotherhood common in that terrain.
— Sandy Stott
Accidents Editor
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